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Casenote

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products:
Stemming the Tide of Motions for Summary
Judgment and Motions for Judgment as a
Matter of Law

In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,Inc.,1 the Supreme Court
addressed the evidentiary burdens required of a plaintiff in an ADEA
case, holding that evidence leading the fact finder to reject the defendant's proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons together with the
elements of a prima facie case may meet a plaintiff's burden to show
intentional discrimination.2 Additionally, the Court at last set forth the
way in which judges may consider a motion for judgment as a matter of
law without weighing the evidence, holding that a court should consider
all the nonmovant's evidence drawing all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmovant, but only consider the movant's evidence that is
uncontradicted or unimpeached and coming from disinterested witnesses.

3

1.
2.
3.

120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).
Id. at 2108-09.
Id. at 2110.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. ("Sanderson"), a toilet seat and
cover manufacturer, hired Roger Reeves in 1955 at the age of eighteen.
In 1995 Reeves worked as a mid-level manager of Sanderson's "Hinge
Room," specifically overseeing the "regular line." Joe Oswalt, Reeves'
counterpart, managed the "special line," and Russell Caldwell supervised
both the regular and special lines. In 1995 Reeves, age fifty-seven,
Caldwell, age forty-five, and Oswalt, mid-thirties, were responsible for
tracking the number of hours worked by each employee. As the
supervisor over the Hinge Room, Oswalt also reviewed all monthly time
sheet reports and disciplined tardy or absent union employees. During
a regular meeting with Sanderson's director of manufacturing, Powe
Chesnut, Caldwell revealed that production levels within the Hinge
Room were down and attributed this decline in production to employee
tardiness and absence during scheduled hours. Chesnut ordered a threemonth audit of the Hinge Room time sheets, discovering that the
monthly time sheet reports did not indicate an attendance or tardiness
problem. The result of the audit revealed several discrepancies, and
Chesnut recommended to his wife, the president of Sanderson, that
Caldwell and Reeves be terminated. Prior to the problem in 1995,
management also found errors attributed to Reeves in 1993 and placed
him on a ninety-day probation period. Based on the recommendation of
her husband, Sanderson's president terminated both Reeves and
Caldwell."
Subsequently, Reeves filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Mississippi, alleging a violation of the Age
Discrimination Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). 5 The basis for
Reeves' claims stemmed from two "age-related statements allegedly
made by Chesnut several months before Reeves' dismissal, namely (1)
that Reeves was so old that he 'must have come over on the Mayflower,'
and (2) that he was 'too damn old to do his job."'6 During trial
Sanderson argued that Reeves was terminated for poor work performance, citing his 1993 probation and inaccurate records in 1995. On the
day that Sanderson terminated Reeves, management cited a failure to
mark one employee as absent on particular days; however, Reeves later
introduced evidence that he was in the hospital on those days, and
therefore, was not responsible for the error. Further, Reeves countered

4. Id. at 2103, 2106 (2000).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1994 & Supp IV 1998).
6. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1999).
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with evidence that he was not responsible for the errors found during
the 1995 audit, offering evidence that those errors were not attributed
to poor work performance. Specifically, Reeves argued that Sanderson's
automated time card system did not always operate properly. Thus,
Reeves and the other supervisor improvised by visually checking the
employee stations at the start of work and then manually logging the
employees' time cards. Both supervisors used this system even if some
of the employees actually arrived earlier in the morning.7
At trial the defense twice moved for a judgment as a matter of law,
but the court allowed the case to go to the jury resulting in a $35,000
award to Reeves. Following the award Sanderson filed a motion for
judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, for a new trial. The
court denied the motion. At the same time the court granted Reeves'
motion for front pay in the amount of $28,490 and increased the jury
verdict by $35,000 in liquidated damages based on the jury's finding that
Sanderson's discriminatory actions were willful.'
On Sanderson's appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed.9 The court of appeals held that Reeves failed to
introduce evidence sufficient for a jury to conclude his termination
resulted from age-based discrimination.' ° While the court noted that
Reeves may have introduced sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find
generalized age-based animus, the court stated, "We must, as an
essential final step, determine whether Reeves presented sufficient
evidence that his age motivated Sanderson's employment decision.""
The appeals court "confined its review of evidence favoring [Reeves] to
that evidence showing that Chesnut had directed derogatory, age-based
comments at [Reeves], and that Chesnut had singled out [Reeves] for
harsher treatment than younger employees." 2 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 3
II.

LEGAL HISTORY

A.

The ADEA Framework
The ADEA makes it "unlawful for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual [over the age of forty] or otherwise

7.
8.

120 S. Ct. at 2103-04, 2106-07.
Id. at 1204.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11.
12.
13.

197 F.3d at 693.
120 S. Ct. at 2108 (citing Reeves, 197 F.3d at 693).
Id. at 2104, 2112.
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discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's age."14 In the statute Congress provided that juries may hear
ADEA cases, 5 noting that defending age-based claims can be particularly challenging because the defense often must confront sympathetic
juries.'" Accordingly, defense attorneys invoke the procedural devices
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, principally making use of
summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ("Rule
56")17 and judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50 ("Rule 50")1 to minimize the number of ADEA cases that
reach a jury or withstand post-verdict scrutiny. 19
Although a few ADEA plaintiffs introduce "smoking gun" evidence that
a court will characterize as direct evidence, most plaintiffs must rely on
circumstantial evidence.2 ° To facilitate elusive proof of employer
motive in circumstantial cases, courts deciding motions in ADEA cases
under Rule 56 or Rule 50 have consistently applied the counterpart Title
VII framework ordering the presentation of evidence in circumstantial
cases, as first elaborated in McDonnell Douglas v. Green,2' which Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine22 refined.2"
In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff, an African-American male,
worked as a mechanic and laboratory technician for McDonnell Douglas
until 1964, when his employment was terminated during a general
reduction in the total work force. Green, an avowed civil rights activist,
claimed that his termination was motivated by race. In protest Green
blocked the entrance road to the plant with his vehicle to impede the
traffic flow during a shift change. Only three weeks after Green's
protest, he observed an advertisement for mechanics listed by McDonnell
Douglas. Green applied for the position, but did not receive the job. At

14. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
15. Id. § 626(c)(2). While Congress was unwilling to allow juries to hear Title VII cases,
it is believed that the provision allowing juries to hear ADEA cases arises in part due to
the "universality" of aging. Although discrimination based on gender and ethnicity may
affect only portions of society, age will eventually affect all persons. See HAROLD S. LEWIS,
CIL

16.

RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 344-45 (1997).

See Frank J. Cavalier, The Recent "Respectability"of Summary Judgments and

Directed Verdicts in IntentionalAge DiscriminationCases: ADEA Case Analysis Through
the Supreme Court'sSummary Judgment 'Prism,"41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 103, 104-06 (1993).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
19. Cavalier, supra note 16, at 106-07.
20. Id. at 113-14.
21. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
22. 450 U.S. 248(1981).
23. LEWIS, supra note 15, at 350.
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Green's Title VII bench trial, in which he alleged, among other things,
a race based refusal to rehire, the judge found the employer's assertion
that Green was not hired because of his unlawful protest after his
termination to be reasonable.24 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that Green's protests were not "protected activities," but reversed
the district court's dismissal of Green's claim relating to racially
discriminatory hiring practices.25
On McDonnell Douglas' appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court
applied a three-stage analytical framework, announcing that the plaintiff
has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of employment
discrimination.2 6 Under the framework plaintiffs may establish a
prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence
showing, "(i) that [plaintiff] belong[ed] to [the protected class]; (ii) that
[plaintiff] applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite [plaintiff's] qualifications, [plaintiff]
was rejected; and (iv) that, after [plaintiff's] rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of [plaintiff's] qualifications." 27 However, the Court noted that
these initial showings, especially element four, should not be construed
On plaintiff's
as a requisite for all cases under all fact patterns.2
showing of a prima facie case, the defendant has the burden to
"articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection."2 9
The third stage of analysis places on the plaintiff the ultimate burden
in the case of proving disparate race-based treatment, and he must
"demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid
reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision." 31 Plaintiff must be given a "full and fair opportunity,"
either during her case in chief or on rebuttal, to make this showing.3 1
The Court suggested that plaintiff could do so by offering a wide variety

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

411 U.S. at 794, 796-97.
Id. at 797-98.
Id. at 802.
Id.
Id. at 802-03.
Id. at 802.

30. Id. at 805.
31. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 717 (1983)
(holding that when a defendant loses on a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law
at the close of the plaintiffs case and then introduces its own witness to testify to a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, it is no longer relevant whether the plaintiff did
create a prima facie case; the defendant has in effect conceded by either not moving for
judgment as a matter of law or by moving and losing).
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of evidence including that white employees were not punished for the
"stall in," that plaintiff suffered race-based treatment during plaintiff's
prior period of employment, or through statistical evidence that the
employer discriminated against plaintiff's protected group.32
In Burdine the Supreme Court refined the McDonnell Douglas
framework.33 Defendant, Texas Department of Community Affairs
("TDCA"), hired Burdine to work as an accounting clerk within the
Public Service Commission ("PSC"). In 1972 Burdine was promoted to
field services coordinator. Shortly after her promotion, her supervisor,
the project director, resigned and Burdine's duties expanded to fill the
void. Burdine quickly applied for the project director position, but the
position remained open. In February 1973, the PSC's funding agency
warned that it planned to stop funding the PSC due to inefficiencies.
Burdine and the TDCA persuaded the Department of Labor to continue
funding the PSC on the condition that the TDCA reform the organizational structure of the PSC. The TDCA subsequently hired a male for
the project director position and hired an additional male for the only
other professional position. The TDCA then fired Burdine. Shortly after
termination the TDCA rehired Burdine and placed her in another area
of the organization with a salary equal to that of the PSC project
director.34
Burdine filed a Title VII suit in the Western District of Texas alleging
gender discrimination. The district court held that the failure to
promote Burdine and her termination were not based on gender
discrimination. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision on the failure to promote, but reversed the lower
court on the issue of termination.35
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the basic McDonnell Douglas framework, but added that "[tihe ultimate burden of persuading the trier of
fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
remains at all times with the plaintiff."36 In stage one the plaintiff has
the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence a prima
facie case of employment discrimination as set forth in McDonnell
Douglas.37 The prima facie case

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
25 n.2
37.

411 U.S. at 804-05.
450 U.S. at 256-58.
Id. at 250-51.
Id. at 251-52.
Id. at 253 (citing Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24,
(1978)).
Id. at 252-53.
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in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's
evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption,
the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact
remains in the case.38
So the defendant must respond to the plaintiff's prima facie case by
producing some evidence that its challenged action was nondiscriminatory.39 The court stressed that the employer's burden is not one of
persuasion, but merely to offer "evidence [that] raises a genuine issue of
fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff."4 The second
stage allows the defendant to confront the plaintiff's prima facie case of
employment discrimination and frames the issues of fact that the
plaintiff must then prove are pretextual. 4 1 At the third stage the
plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to persuade the fact finder
that the employer imposed on him the adverse term or condition for an
unlawful or discriminatory purpose, and the plaintiff "retains the burden
of persuasion."" The plaintiff may meet this burden "either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation [at stage two] is unworthy of credence."43
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals improperly required
defendant to persuade the court about a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason rather than merely offer admissible rebuttal evidence.4 4 The
Court reasoned that a plaintiff is protected from false responses by a
defendant because: (1) a defendant's proffered reasons "must be clear
and reasonably specific;" (2) a defendant would certainly have an
incentive to try to persuade the trier of fact; 4and
(3) plaintiffs have
5
access to broad discovery rules under Title VII.

Left unresolved by both McDonnell Douglas and Burdine was what
action a court should take after stage three of the McDonnell Douglas
framework. Unsurprisingly, a significant split arose among the lower

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

254.
254-55.
255.
256.

43. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05).
44. Id. at 257-58. The court of appeals reasoned that a defendant, without the burden

of persuasion at stage two, would have an incentive to give a false reason for its actions.
The Supreme Court, defending its holding in McDonnell Douglas, reasoned that the
plaintiff is nevertheless protected. Id. at 259.
45. Id. at 258.
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courts. 46 A majority of courts of appeals concluded that at stage three,
a plaintiff need only rebut the proffered reason given by the defendant
at stage two, but is not required under the "pretext" standard to prove
affirmatively that an unlawful discriminatory reason figured into the
challenged decision.4 7 A minority of courts required that a plaintiff, in
addition to or instead of disproving the defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, must offer sufficient evidence affirmatively proving
the true reason was age (or under Title VII race, sex, religion, or
national origin). 48 The minority standard is known as the "pretext
plus" standard.4 s In application that standard prevents many cases50
from reaching trial even though there may be real issues of fact.
Scholarly comment has opined "that many of the courts that have
advanced the 'pretext-plus' rule have done so largely out of skepticism
about the prevalence of bias in the workplace or out of deep-rooted
hostility to what they perceive as the proliferation of nonmeritorious
discrimination claims."5
In 1993 the Supreme Court decided St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks,52 trying to settle the lower courts' inconsistency on the pretext
plus question. Hicks, an African-American corrections officer, worked for
St. Mary's Honor Center for six years prior to his termination. During
that time he earned a position as a shift commander, and all evidence
suggested that his work was satisfactory until supervisory personnel
changes occurred. In 1984 St. Mary's assigned Hicks a new supervisor
and was then frequently disciplined for infractions while other caucasion
shift commanders did not receive any discipline for the same offenses.
Hicks' supervisors demoted him as punishment for one alleged infraction
then, on June 4, 1994, terminated him after a heated confrontaand 53
tion.
Hicks subsequently filed a Title VII action, alleging disparate
treatment and establishing a prima facie case under the McDonnell

46. Jody H. Oedell, Between Pretext Only and Pretext Plus: UnderstandingSt. Mary's
HonorCenter v.Hicks and its Application to Summary Judgment, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1251, 1258-59 (1994).
47. Id.

48. Catherine J. Lancott, The Defendant Lies and the PlaintiffLoses: The Fallacy of
the 'Pretext Plus"Rule in Employment DiscriminationCases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. at 59-66
(1991).
49. Id.
50. Id.

51. Id. at 69 (citing Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination
Cases: Toward a Theory of ProceduralJustice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1209-10 (1981).
52. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
53. Id. at 504-05.
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Douglas framework. St. Mary's countered the prima facie case with
evidence revealing Hicks' disciplinary problems prior to his termination.
Hicks responded with pretext evidence disproving St. Mary's proffered
reasons, but without, in the court's view, affirmatively showing that his
termination was due to race.54 The trial court ruled in favor of St.
Mary's, noting that while Hicks proved the "'existence of a crusade to
terminate him, he has not proven that the crusade was racially rather
than personally motivated.' 55 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, accepting the "pretext only" standard.56
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, first analogized the burdens
prescribed by McDonnell Douglas to the presumptions described in
Federal Rule of Evidence 301. 57 While a burden of production is
incumbent on the defendant at stage two of the McDonnell Douglas
framework, the burden of persuasion remains always with the plaintiff,68 and when "the defendant has succeeded in carrying its burden of
production, the McDonnell Douglas framework-with its presumptions
and burdens-is no longer relevant." 9 The Court agreed that evidence
leading the fact finder to reject the proffered "reasons put forward by the
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of
mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice
to show intentional discrimination." 60 However, it is wrong for a court
to compel judgment merely because the plaintiff establishes the
defendant's proffered reasons are pretext."' This means that the jury
should be instructed that it may, but need not, render judgment for the
plaintiff based on a prima facie case plus evidence of falsity of the
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. 2 To decide for the plaintiff on
such evidence, the fact finder must find not only that the employer's

54. Id. at 505-07.
55. Id. at 508 (quoting Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D.
Mo. 1991)).
56. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492-93 (8th Cir. 1992).
57. FED. R. EVID. 301 provides that:
[i]n all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress
or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed
the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but
does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of
nonpersuation, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was
originally cast.

Id.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Oedell, supra note 46, at 1263.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S at 510.
Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was false, but that the real reason
was discrimination on a ground prohibited by Title VII
The central
issue then is whom should the court believe. "It is not enough, in other
words, to disbelieve the employer; the fact finder must believe the
plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination." 4 Thus, the Court
required that a judge ruling in favor of a plaintiff must specifically make
a finding of intentional unlawful discrimination. 5
St. Mary's seems to have accepted the "pretext-only" approach as
matter of evidence, but requires dual pretext-plus findings of fact, based
on that evidence to support a conclusion of liability. The opinion
generated continuing confusion among the lower courts.66 Most, but
not all courts after St. Mary's agreed that a jury or judge may find for
a plaintiff with no additional evidence of discriminatory intent beyond
the prima facie case and evidence disproving the defendant's legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason. 7 As noted by the dissent in St. Mary's,
language in the majority opinion appeared to support either interpretation.68
B.

Evidence Considerationsfor Rule 50 Motions
Rule 50 authorizes judges to override and hence limit the power of the
jury to hear a federal civil case as granted under the Seventh Amend-

63.
64.

Id. at 519.
Id. The McDonnell Douglas/Burdine/St. Mary's analytical framework governs

decisions on Rule 56 motions for summary judgment and Rule 50 motions for judgment as
a matter of law. It does not correspond neatly to the three stages of trial at which the
parties offer evidence-plaintiffs case in chief, defendant's defense, and plaintiffs rebuttal.
For example, a plaintiff may anticipate the defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason and, accordingly, offer pretext evidence, in addition to evidence meeting her prima
facie burden, during her case in chief. Similarly, the trial judge should not rule on the
adequacy of the plaintiffs prima facie case once the defendant has called its first witness;
the prima facie case is designed simply to decide whether the defendant must call a
witness. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714-16. Nor should the jury be charged on the McDonnell
Douglas allocation of burdens once all the evidence is closed. See Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Comm., 738 F.2d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 1984).
65. 509 U.S. at 511 n.4.
66. Oedell, supra note 46, at 1267.
67. Id.
68. 509 U.S. at 535 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Court stated in one discussion that
"rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the
ultimate fact of intentional discrimination. . . '[n]o additional proof of discrimination is required.'
Id. at 511 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Hicks, 970 F.2d at 493).
Conversely, the Court also stated in another portion of the opinion that "a reason cannot
be proved to be 'a pretext for discrimination'unless it is shown both that the reason was
false, and that discrimination was the real reason." Id. at 515.
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ment of the United States Constitution." The rule is designed to
ensure that judgment is not entered on jury findings that are unsupportable on the facts presented. v The rule provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) If during trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue
and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury

to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue
against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter
of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot
under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a
favorable finding on that issue."
In deciding Rule 50 motions, judges must not perform an ultimate
weighing of evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses.72 Yet,
judges must forecast whether a reasonable jury could find what a party
must prove by a requisite burden of proof-most commonly, a preponderance of the evidence.78 Courts have applied the rule quite differently
regarding what evidence the court is free to consider when determining
whether to grant a motion under Rule 50. 74 There are essentially three
distinct historical standards: (1) courts may consider all the evidence,
that is evidence favoring either party; (2) only the evidence favorable to
the nonmovant; or (3) all the evidence favorable to the nonmovant, but
only evidence favoring the movant that is uncontradicted and unimpeached.75
In 1949 the Supreme Court finally weighed in on the topic in the case
of Wilkerson v. McCarthy,7" but many judges discounted the opinion

69. FED. R. CIv. P. 50; U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
70. Edward H. Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Court,
55 MINN. L. REV. 903, 905 (1971). The basic problem with the use of juries is that
adjudication requires both a fundamental understanding of a specific area of the law as
well as the ability to properly apply the law to the facts of a particular case. Id. "The
merciful obscurity of the verdict commonly alleviates the embarrassment which might
result from any detailed knowledge of a jury's chosen means of discharging its duties." Id.
"Directed verdicts are the basic means for controlling jury performance in such cases." Id.
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 50 (emphasis added).
72. See Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1970).
73. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
74. 427 F.2d at 4.
75. Id.
76. 336 U.S. 53 (1949). Wilkerson worked as a railroad switchman in Denver,
Colorado. While working in the railroad yard, plaintiff was injured when he fell into a pit.
Wilkerson, at the time he fell, was attempting to walk across the pit on a narrow board.
Apparently a greasy substance on the board's surface caused Wilkerson to lose his balance.
Wilkerson filed a suit in the federal district court alleging a violation of the Federal
Employers Liability Act ("FELA"). The trial court ruled on a Rule 50 motion in favor of the
employer and the Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 55-58.
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because Justice Black failed to cite authority for the standard set
the case79 as applying
forth.77 Additionally, many judges interpreted
78
only to Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA") cases.
In Wilkerson Justice Black stated, without citing any authority, that
"lilt is the established rule that in passing upon whether there is
sufficient evidence to submit an issue to the jury we need look only to
the evidence and reasonable inferences which tend to support the case
80
of a litigant against whom a peremptory instruction has been given."
This passage, adopting approach two, is ultimately responsible for the
resulting debate and continued division among the lower courts. 8'
While some courts adopted the plain language set forth in Wilkerson,
other courts refused to believe the language "meant what it said" and
persisted with one of the other two approaches.82
Some courts have adopted the rule as stated in Boeing Co. v.
Shipman8 3:
the Court should consider all of the evidence-not just that evidence
which supports the non-mover's case-but in the light and with all
reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the
motion .... However, it is the function of the jury as the traditional
finder of the facts, and not the Court, to weigh conflicting evidence and
inferences, and determine the credibility of witnesses.84
Still other courts have articulated approach three, holding that all

evidence in favor of the nonmovant shall be considered, but only
evidence supporting the movant that is uncontradicted or unimpeached. 8 Because the Supreme Court has not directly confronted the issue
since Wilkerson, lower courts continue to apply varying approaches.86

77.

See 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
§ 2529, at 298 (2d ed. 1994); Wilkerson, 336 U.S. at 57.
45 U.S.C. § 51-60 (1994).
Id.; see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 77.
Wilkerson, 336 U.S. at 57.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 77, at 298.

PROCEDURE

78.
79.
80.
81.

82. Id.
83. 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969), overruled on othergrounds by Gautreaux v. Seurlock
Marine, 107 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1997).

84. Id. at 374.
85. See, e.g., Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 656 n.6, 657
(1st Cir. 1961).
86. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 77, at 298.
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COURT'S RATIONALE IN REEVES

Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court in Reeves, overturned
the decision of the appeals court.8 7 The unanimous opinion clarified
the plaintiff's burden of proof in ADEA employment discrimination cases
and resolved the debate about what evidence a trial judge should
consider in deciding a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of
law.""
The Court first addressed the evidentiary burdens required of a
plaintiff in an ADEA case. 9 Recognizing that ADEA cases often must
rely on circumstantial evidence to prove discrimination, the Court
applied the Title VII McDonnell Douglas framework to analyze Reeves'
ADEA claim.' The Court found that Reeves "undisputedly" established
a prima facie case and also rebutted defendant's proffered explanation.9
The Court then addressed the lower court's disagreement
regarding the proper interpretation of St. Mary's.92 The issue was
whether St. Mary's endorsed the "pretext plus" standard or stood for the
more relaxed standard that when a plaintiff proved the defendant's
proffered reason was pretext, a judge or jury could permissibly find for
the plaintiff without additional proof that unlawful discrimination was
a factor in the termination.9 3
The Court adopted the less stringent interpretation of St. Mary's,
holding that while:
rejection of the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action does not compel judgment for the plaintiff ...

it is permissible

for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the
falsity of the employer's explanation ....

Proof that the defendant's

explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination. 94
The Court reasoned that a trier of fact may consider dishonesty on the
part of the defendant as an admission of guilt and may infer the guilt of
that party.95 Relying on Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,9 the

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

120 S. Ct. at 2112.
Id. at 2105-06, 2108.
Id. at 2105.
Id. at 2105-07.
Id.

92. Id. at 2108.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95.

Id.

96. 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
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Court stated that because the employer is best situated to offer reasons
for its actions, when those proffered reasons are eliminated, it is likely
that the actual reason was an impermissible one.97
The Court observed that the principal defense asserted by Sanderson
was that Reeves had not been tracking the employees' hours accurately.98 However, Reeves offered adequate evidence for a reasonable fact
finder to find that Sanderson's assertions were unlawful or untruthful.99 Reeves offered evidence that the automated time clocks were
inaccurate and required him to manually write in the employees' arrival
time, on many occasions. He also established that he was not responsible for reviewing the monthly statements and was not responsible for
errors that appeared on the monthly reports. Further, Reeves proved
that he was not at work on some of the days that he allegedly marked
an absent employee as present.'0 0 The Court concluded that Reeves
met his burden of proving that Sanderson's proffered reason was
unfounded or untruthful because in each case Sanderson conceded
Reeves' assertions under cross examination."' The Court held that it
was permissible for the trier of fact to infer discrimination based on the
rejection of Sanderson's explanations.0 2
The Court was careful to warn that there may be cases when the
evidence negates a finding that the employer unlawfully discriminated
and the fact finder would be unable to infer discrimination, even though
a plaintiff meets the burden of establishing a prima facie case and
successfully rebuts the defendant's proffered reason.' ° For example,
there may be distinct evidence that "conclusively reveals some other
nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision."' °4 The Court
concluded its discussion suggesting that a judge hearing a Rule 50
motion should consider a number of factors including: "the strength of
the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the
employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the
employer's case and that properly may be considered on a motion for
judgment as a matter of law."'0 5 However, the Court withheld discus-

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

120 S. Ct. at 2108-09.
Id. at 2107.
Id. at 2108.
Id. at 2107-08.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2109.
Id.
Id.
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sion of what circumstances would 10in6 practice afford an employer a right
to a judgment as a matter of law.
Justice Ginsburg concurred but wrote separately to urge the Court to
define "more precisely the circumstances in which plaintiffs will be
required to submit evidence beyond these two categories in order to
survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law."0 7 However, Justice
Ginsberg noted that she did not believe the circumstances predicted by
the majority would commonly arise.01 8
In Part II the Court held that a lower court deciding a Rule 50 motion
should consider all the evidence supporting a nonmovant but only the
uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence favoring the movant, and
possibly only to the extent that the evidence favoring the movant comes
from disinterested witnesses. 0 9 It also reaffirmed that in assessing
whether that evidence is sufficient to enable a reasonable jury to have
found as it did, the trial court should draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmovant. 110
The Court began its discussion by analogizing the Rule 50
evidence standard to that applicable at summary judgement under Rule
56."' The Court acknowledged that in prior rulings it held that a
court deciding a Rule 56 motion must "review the record 'taken as a
whole.'""' 2 Further, the Court recalled that it ruled in Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc.,"' that "the standard for granting summary
judgment 'mirrors' the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such
that 'the inquiry under each is the same.""' 4 Accordingly, the Court
held that when considering a Rule 50 motion the judge shall consider all
the evidence in the record." 5 A court should "draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party," and the judge should not
make credibility determinations, as those are duties of the jury. 1 6 To
implement the latter command, "although the court should review the

106. Id. The limiting language found in Reeves presents the most likely avenue lower
courts may take in the future to avoid the Reeves burden of proof standard. See Schnabel
v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90 (2d. Cir. 2000).
107. 120 S. Ct. at 2112 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2110.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 495 U.S. 574, 587
(1986)).
113. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
114. 120 S. Ct. at 2110 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51).
115. Id.
116. Id.
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record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving
party that the jury is not required to believe."117 In summary the
Court held that a court should consider all the nonmovant's evidence,
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant, but only
consider the movant's evidence that is uncontradicted or unimpeached
and coming from disinterested witnesses.'18 Thus, the Court agreed
with historical approach (1) that the evidence of the moving party as
well as the nonmoving party should be taken into account, but actually
adopted approach (3) by limiting the relevant evidence of the moving
party to that evidence which is uncontradicted and unimpeached." 9
In applying its holding to the facts of Reeves, the Court found that the
court of appeals failed to consider plaintiff's evidence "supporting
[plaintiff's] prima facie case and undermining [defendant's] nondiscriminatory explanation." 2 ' Specifically, the court of appeals failed to
consider that Chesnut's decision to fire Reeves was "motivated by agebased animus" and that Chesnut was principally responsible for
petitioner's firing.121 Hence, the lower court erred when it discounted
the statements because they were not made directly to Reeves at the
time of his termination.'2 2 In doing so the court failed to "draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the [nonmovant]." 23 Additionally, the
court of appeals did not consider the "evidence that Chesnut was the
actual decision maker," and it discounted Reeves' case in stating that
there was "'no evidence to suggest that any other decision makers were
motivated by age. ' 124 Essentially, the Court determined that the court
of appeals impermissibly "substituted its judgment concerning the
weight of the evidence for the jury's." 2 '
III.

IMPLICATIONS

Reeves has the potential to noticeably reduce the success rates of
motions for summary judgment and motions for judgment as a matter
of law in federal civil cases generally and employment discrimination
cases in particular. First, as to employment discrimination cases,
because the Court thought that ADEA and Title VII cases use the same

117.

Id.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2111.
Id. at 2110.
Id. at 2111.
Id.
Id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 197 F.3d at 694).
Id.
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standard ordering the presentation of evidence, the analytical framework
holding in Reeves should at a minimum extend beyond ADEA cases to
cases under Title VII. All early indicators suggest that126this logical
extension will gain common acceptance among the courts.
Second, although Reeves is an employment discrimination case, the
Court used nonADEA or Title VII cases as authority to decide what

evidence the court should consider when assessing the requirements of
a Rule 50 motion. 127 The Court has several times insisted that its
interpretation of Federal Rules apply transubstantively.1 2 Accordingly, the Reeves construction of Rule 50 should apply to any other federal
civil action the same way that it applied to an employment discrimination case. The practical implication being the nonmovant may survive
a motion for judgment as a matter of law more easily because the judge
will not be permitted to consider any contradicted or impeached evidence
offered by the moving party.
Third, the Court's re-equation of the Rule 50 standard with the
standard for granting summary judgment under Rule 56 suggests that
lower courts may follow the Reeves rule in deciding what evidence the
trial judge may consider in ruling on motions for summary judgment as

well. 129

126. See, e.g., Hinson v. Clinch County Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821,827 (11th Cir. 2000);
Bell v. EPA, 32 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2000); Tyler v. Re/Max Mountain States, Inc., 232
F.3d 808, 812 (10th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that the Reeves standard should apply
to Title VII cases just as in ADEA cases.
127. 120 S. Ct. at 2110.
128. The Court unanimously held in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & CoordinationUnit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993), that a plaintiff alleging a section
1983 violation against a municipality is not required to file a complaint with heightened
specificity.. Id. at 168. Following the basic guideline of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
is adequate to avoid a dismissal. Id. at 165. In so ruling the Court overruled the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which argued that the specificity required in a complaint
increases with the complexity of the case. Id. at 169.
The Court reached this conclusion by finding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
should be applied the same way in all cases. Id. at 168. Unless specifically stated in Rule
9, plaintiffs are only required to follow Rule 8. Id. See also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523
U.S. 574, 601 (1998) (holding that the federal rules apply to all cases, and it is improper
for courts to create heightened rules for certain claims).
129. See, e.g., Thomas v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 233 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2000).
Notably, Reeves was also a Fifth Circuit case. In Thomas the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the element of
causation in a "dram shop" negligence suit. Id. at 327. The court began,
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must review the record as a
whole, but must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury
is not required to believe. That is, we give credence to evidence favoring the
nonmoving party as well as that evidence supporting the moving the [sic] party
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Finally, as for the analytical framework, Reeves will make it easier for
a plaintiff to reach the jury because courts will no longer be able to
require "plus" evidence. In simple cross examination of defendant's
witness's (impeachment), even without affirmative evidence to the
contrary, contradiction may suffice to support a verdict under Rule 50,
and by extension to defeat summary judgment under Rule 56. The
practical effect will likely increase the settlement value of employment
discrimination cases. Still, old habits die hard with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure3 ° and courts accustomed to routinely granting
summary judgment since the Supreme Court's trilogy on the subject. 3'
may resist whole-hearted or immediate implementation of Reeves." 2
TREVOR K. Ross

that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that such evidence
comes from disinterested witnesses.
Id. at 329 (footnotes omitted). The court held that the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence
supporting causation was sufficient to meet the threshold of Rule 56 when the only
evidence supporting the movant was from "interested" parties and lacked credibility. Id.
at 332. The significance of Thomas is that it applied the principles of Reeves to a
nonemployment discrimination case that deals with Rule 56 as opposed to Rule 50. See
also Hinson, 231 F.3d at 826 (applying Reeves to a summary judgment motion); Bell, 232
F.3d at 549 (applying Reeves to a summary judgment motion); Glenn Distributors Corp. v.
Carlisle Plastics, Inc., CIV. A. No. 98-2317, 2000 WL 1224941, *6 (E.D. Pa., Aug. 29, 2000)
(applying Reeves to a Rule 50 nonemployment discrimination case).
130. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 77, § 1216, at 150.
131. See Anderson, 477 U.S. 242; Celtoex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986);
Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574.
132. See, e.g., Chapman v. Al Transport, 229 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2000); Schnabel, 232
F.3d 83; but see EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 855-56 (4th Cir. 2001)
(adopting Hinson approach over Schnabel).

